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Debates about the optimal design of bank safety nets and the consequences of regulatory 
interventions into and bailouts of distressed banks feature prominently in recent years. When banks 
are troubled, authorities often take actions aimed at reducing bank risk taking to limit failures, 
minimize losses to the deposit insurer and taxpayers, and avoid disruptions to the economy.
1
 These 
actions typically involve regulatory interventions (intrusions by regulators such as instructions to: 
dismiss executives, pay fines, change processes, or restrict some activities), and/or bailouts in the 
form of capital support. A growing literature examines how such actions affect bank performance 
with a particular focus on risk taking (e.g., Dam and Koetter, 2012; Delis, Tsoumas, and Staikouras, 
2013).  
However, little is known about how these actions affect banks’ ability to create liquidity for 
their customers, a core function of banks which supports the macroeconomy.2 We know of no 
empirical work on the effects of regulatory interventions on liquidity creation, and only a few 
studies on the effects of capital support on one element of liquidity creation, lending.
3
 There is, 
however, related theory on these issues. One theory predicts that regulatory interventions trigger 
reductions in portfolio risk (Mailath and Mester, 1994), and since the portfolio adjustments may 
involve reductions in risky lending activities, bank liquidity creation may decline as well. The 
theories on the role of capital, which is increased by capital support, yield conflicting predictions 
about how capital affects liquidity creation as we explain in detail in Section 3.2.
4
 Interestingly, 
authorities often state higher lending (a key component of bank liquidity creation) as an explicit 
                                                          
1 
James (1991) shows that bank failures can cause large losses to the deposit insurer, and Samolyk (1994) documents 
that bank failures are a prime factor for transmission of shocks from the banking sector to the real economy. 
2
 Banks create liquidity on the balance sheet by transforming illiquid assets such as loans into liquid liabilities such as 
transactions deposits; they also create liquidity off the balance sheet through loan commitments and similar claims to 
liquid funds (see Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Donaldson, Piacentino, and Thakor, 2015 for summaries). 
3 In related literature, there are studies on the effects of changes in capital requirements on lending, a key component of 
liquidity creation (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1994; Peek and Rosengren, 1995; Thakor, 1996), as well as studies of changes 
in supervisory toughness on lending (e.g., Bizer, 1993; Berger, Kyle, and Scalise, 2001; Kiser, Prager, and Scott, 2012).   
4
 Capital support and higher capital also often enhance the bank’s probability of survival, particularly during financial 
crises (Kick, Koetter, and Poghosyan, 2010; Berger and Bouwman, 2013). 
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goal of capital support (e.g., Philippon and Schnabl, 2013; Duchin and Sosyura, 2014).  
Empirical investigation of these topics is challenging for four reasons. First, information 
about regulatory interventions and capital support is usually confidential. We overcome this 
challenge by exploiting unique supervisory data from the Deutsche Bundesbank (henceforth 
Bundesbank) that include information on all actions taken by authorities in Germany from 1999-
2009. The authorities include government agencies (which engage in regulatory interventions and 
some capital support) and bankers associations’ insurance schemes (which provide most of the 
capital support). 
A second challenge is that even when authorities’ actions are made public, such actions are 
typically only observed during crises, potentially confounding the effects of the actions with those 
of the crisis. An advantage of our sample is that it spans crisis as well as non-crisis years, and 
regulatory interventions and capital support occur frequently during both time periods.  
A third challenge is that researchers typically have information only on subsets of the 
actions by authorities (e.g., they may have data on capital support but not on regulatory 
interventions). They may thus inadvertently ascribe the effects of the missing actions to the 
observed actions. We do not face this challenge as we have data on all such actions in Germany.  
A final challenge is an identification problem that arises from the non-randomness of these 
actions. Naïvely regressing changes in liquidity creation on regulatory interventions and capital 
support may fail to identify causal effects. Even in the absence of these actions, banks may 
recognize problems and adjust liquidity creation. For example, being troubled may diminish banks’ 
ability to offer long-term loans and loan commitments, reducing liquidity creation, while at the 
same time also triggering actions by authorities. We deal with this issue using instrumental variable 
(IV) analysis, employing three instruments for regulatory interventions and capital support.  
The first instrument is the vote share of political parties with pro-business orientation in 
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federal state elections, where timing follows an exogenously imposed rule. This instrument reflects 
a crucial feature of the German institutional framework in which politicians appoint regulators. As 
shown in Dam and Koetter (2012) and described in detail below, this instrument allows us to isolate 
plausibly exogenous variation in interventions arising from the political situation on the federal state 
level. Moreover, this approach is also in line with a growing literature which stresses the role of 
political connections in government interventions and capital support in banking (Brown and Dinc, 
2005; Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012; Dam and Koetter, 2012; Duchin and Sosyura, 2012, 2014).  
The second instrument is the distance between a bank’s headquarters and the location of the 
corresponding bankers associations’ insurance scheme which may provide capital support. Distance 
proxies for information asymmetries and transportation costs (Degryse and Ongena, 2005) which 
impede the insurance scheme’s ability to monitor a bank’s condition. This may reduce the 
likelihood of capital support, but may increase the likelihood of interventions by regulators to 
compensate.  
The third instrument, the availability of a possible acquirer, exploits unique legal provisions 
in Germany which restrict the availability of possible acquirers for ailing banks. This instrument 
builds on the insight that acquisitions may substitute for regulatory interventions and capital support 
because private-sector arrangements are the preferred way of resolving bank distress in Germany.  
As part of our empirical tests below, we document that all our instruments are strong and 
satisfy the overidentification restrictions. We also present economic arguments to illustrate that our 
instruments are plausibly exogenous. Since the instruments are most appropriate for banks that 
operate in geographically delimited markets, our main analyses focus on banks that operate in local 
markets, but the results also hold when banks that operate nationwide are included. 
Our key dependent variable, bank liquidity creation, is calculated using a slight variation of 
Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) methodology, described in detail in Appendix A. In brief, liquidity 
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creation is the weighted sum of all asset-side, liability-side, and off-balance sheet activities. Since 
liquidity is created when banks transform illiquid assets (e.g., long-term loans) into liquid liabilities 
(e.g., transactions deposits), we give positive weights to both illiquid assets and liquid liabilities. 
Similarly, since banks destroy liquidity when they transform liquid assets (e.g., securities) into 
illiquid liabilities (like subordinated debt), we give negative weights to liquid assets and illiquid 
liabilities. Off-balance sheet activities (e.g., loan commitments) receive weights consistent with 
those assigned to functionally similar on-balance sheet activities. We analyze total liquidity creation 
for each bank, and also its components (asset-side, liability-side, and off-balance sheet liquidity 
creation). Further tests investigate lending (one key component of asset-side liquidity creation) and 
risk taking.  
Over our sample period of 1999 – 2009, regulators intervened into 278 banks (11% of 
banks) and capital support was provided to 114 banks (5%). Capital support averaged 36% of Tier 1 
capital. A total of 33 banks (1%) were subject to both actions. Thus, sizeable proportions of banks 
received regulatory interventions and/or capital support, allowing for meaningful analyses. 
Our key findings are that regulatory interventions robustly decrease liquidity creation, while 
capital support does not affect liquidity creation. We run many additional tests. For example, to 
address whether unhealthy banks react more intensively to regulatory interventions and capital 
support, we split the sample at the median equity ratio. These tests yield intuitive results. 
Regulatory interventions display significance for banks with capital ratios below the median, and 
the effect is greater in magnitude than for the full sample. We find no significant effects on banks 
with equity ratios above the median. The effects of capital support remain insignificant across these 
subsamples.  
To better understand the driving forces behind the declines in liquidity creation, we 
decompose liquidity creation into asset-side, liability-side, and off-balance sheet liquidity creation. 
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We show that regulatory interventions reduce liquidity creation on the liability side and off the 
balance sheet, but do not affect liquidity creation on the asset side. Capital support reduces asset-
side liquidity creation but increases liability-side liquidity creation: these two effects cancel out 
each other, explaining why we find no overall effect of capital support on the bank’s total liquidity 
creation. 
We also examine asset-side liquidity creation from a different perspective by looking at 
lending. We find that capital support reduces total loans, in line with our finding that capital support 
reduces asset-side liquidity creation, and this effect is larger for corporate loans than for retail loans.  
We further check whether regulatory interventions and capital support have the intended 
effect of reducing risk taking. We find that risk taking declines in response to both actions.  
One might expect that authorities’ actions do not have as much bite when the threat is 
perceived to be less. To address this, we decompose regulatory interventions alternatively into 
moderate versus severe ones, and into ones that target business activities versus management. We 
find our results to be generally weaker when regulatory interventions are moderate and when they 
target business activities.  
Our findings provide insights into the design of prudential regulation and supervision of 
banks. First, they suggest that regulatory interventions trigger possibly unintended consequences in 
that they reduce liquidity creation, with potentially adverse consequences for the macroeconomy. 
Beyond considering the effects on risk taking, regulatory authorities might also consider the impact 
on the macroeconomy when deciding on interventions. Second, our results suggest that capital 
support does not affect the ability to create liquidity. This contributes to the literature on capital 
support, which finds conflicting results (Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel, 2011; Black and 
Hazelwood, 2013; Giannetti and Simonov, 2013; Li, 2013, Duchin and Sosyura, 2014; Berger and 
Roman, 2015).  
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Our paper is also related to several other strands of literature. It builds on studies on the 
effect of regulations on bank soundness (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2004; Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Detragiache, and Tressel, 2008; Delis and Staikouras, 2011). It informs the debate on optimal 
closure and bailout policies (Boot and Thakor, 1993; Mailath and Mester, 1994; Aghion, Bolton, 
and Fries, 1999; Dwyer and Hasan, 2007; Ennis and Keister, 2010; Bhattacharya and Nyborg, 
2013). Our findings also complement Delis, Tsoumas, and Staikouras (2013), who show that 
regulatory enforcement actions issued in response to safety and soundness concerns in the U.S. do 
not consistently reduce bank risk taking, while supervisory actions aimed at internal control and risk 
management help improve bank soundness. Our work extends research on safety net features in 
Germany by Dam and Koetter (2012), Fischer, Heinz, Rocholl, and Steffen (2012), and Gropp, 
Gruendl, and Guettler (2014). None of these studies provide direct evidence on the effects of 
authorities’ actions on bank liquidity creation.  
We proceed as follows. Section 1 discusses the institutional background. Section 2 describes 
our identification strategy and Section 3 contains the results. Section 4 concludes.  
1. Institutional Background 
1.1 German banking sector 
The German banking sector has three pillars: private-sector, public-sector, and cooperative banks, 
which differ in ownership structures and geographical reach (Brunner, Decressin, Hardy, and 
Kudela, 2004). The private-sector pillar contains nationwide and foreign banks, as well as small 
banks operating in local markets. Public-sector banks include savings banks and Landesbanks 
owned by governments at the city-, county-, or state-level. The cooperative pillar comprises 
cooperative banks and central credit cooperatives. Savings banks and cooperative banks operate in 
geographically segmented markets, reflecting a regional principle (“Regionalprinzip”), which 
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constrains these banks’ activities to their assigned regions.5 A region usually consists of one or a 
limited number of multiple (contiguous) counties. The regional principle is embedded in statute for 
savings banks, and also de facto enforced for cooperative banks.  
The German regulatory framework shares similarities with other European countries, Japan, 
and the U.S., and the regulatory interventions and capital support used in Germany have also been 
employed in those countries (e.g., Houston and James, 1993; Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012; 
Black and Hazelwood, 2013; Delis, Tsoumas, and Staikouras, 2013; Giannetti and Simonov, 2013; 
Li, 2013; Duchin and Sosyura, 2014; Berger and Roman, 2015). There are, however, differences in 
the institutional design of safety net arrangements and the implementation of rescue packages. 
1.2 Regulatory interventions and capital support 
The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (“Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht,” 
BaFin) is responsible for regulatory interventions. However, the BaFin collaborates closely with the 
Bundesbank in this process. In most instances, the Bundesbank collects the data on violations of the 
Banking Act and recommends that the BaFin take action. The BaFin may then decide to take action 
after additional consultation with the Bundesbank, particularly with the supervisor from the regional 
Bundesbank office responsible for on-site supervision of the bank. The regional Bundesbank office 
is located either in the federal state capital or, in instances where the regional Bundesbank office is 
responsible for multiple federal states, in the largest metropolitan area in these states.  
We classify all actions mentioned in the German Banking Act (Articles 45-48) as regulatory 
interventions: restrictions and prohibitions of deposit taking, restrictions and prohibitions of lending 
activities, restrictions and prohibitions of profit distribution, restructuring of business activities 
(primarily of lending activities), limitations on the scope of managerial decisions, instructions to the 
                                                          
5 
Appendix B shows the geographic segmentation of banking markets in Germany. It uses the federal state Bavaria as an 
example (“Bundesland”, Figure B.1) and illustrates its administrative district borders (“Regierungsbezirke”, Figure B.2) 
and county borders in Upper Bavaria (“Landkreise”, Figure B.3). Counties are nested within administrative districts. 
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bank’s management,6 appointment of a trustee, actual dismissal of executives, hearings about 
dismissal of executives, official disapprovals, fines for executives, fines for the institution, warnings 
of executives, and threats of measures according to the Banking Act. We focus on these 
interventions because they are moderate to severe intrusions which may affect liquidity creation.
7
 
Routine letters are the only actions we do not classify as regulatory interventions, since these are 
minor and less likely to affect bank behavior. Untabulated regressions confirm that liquidity 
creation does not change significantly after routine letters are sent. 
Capital support is primarily provided by the bankers associations’ insurance schemes. Each 
of the three banking pillars has one umbrella bankers association, and several regional sub-
associations, typically at the state level. Member institutions receive compulsory insurance from 
their umbrella organization (banks in the private-sector and cooperative pillars) or from their 
regional sub-association (banks in the public-sector pillar). Similar to the FDIC in the U.S., 
insurance schemes engage in on- and off-site monitoring. These monitoring activities are 
independent of the surveillance activities of the BaFin and the Bundesbank. All insurance schemes 
are risk-based, funded by banks, and are not guaranteed by taxpayers.  
Capital support by an insurance scheme requires approval by its board (appointed by 
representatives of member banks, e.g., executive officers and nonexecutives of member banks) or a 
committee of the insurance scheme. It targets the weakest institutions, is involuntary, and in some 
cases is tied to liquidating reserves or signing debtor warrants.
8 
The government provided capital 
support to six troubled banks in our sample during the recent crisis via the Financial Market 
                                                          
6
 These instructions are not officially defined but are applicable if the institution is “in danger to the discharge of an 
institution's obligations to its creditors, especially to the safety of the assets entrusted to it, or if there are grounds for 
suspecting that effective supervision of the institution is not possible” (Article 46, Section 1, No. 1). 
7
 The effects of regulatory interventions on liquidity creation are ambiguous due to the way liquidity creation is 
measured. For example, one might expect that lending restrictions reduce liquidity creation but this is not necessarily 
true since different loan categories enter the calculation of liquidity creation with positive, negative, or zero weights.  
8
 Once a bankers associations’ insurance scheme classifies a bank as insolvent, and if there is no other bank available to 
acquire the distressed entity, the bank in question receives capital support to meet regulatory requirements.  
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Stabilization Fund (“Bundesanstalt für Finanzmarktstabilisierung,” SoFFin). Our tests combine 
capital support by the bankers associations’ insurance schemes and the SoFFin, but the results are 
robust to excluding the SoFFin-supported banks. The results are available upon request. 
There is no predetermined ordering of the timing of regulatory interventions and capital 
support. Banks may receive regulatory interventions before capital support (18% of all cases), in the 
year of capital support (7%), after capital support (10%), or without receiving capital support at any 
point (65%). Appendix C presents additional details. Figures C.1 and C.2 show the geographic 
distribution of regulatory interventions and capital support, respectively. Figure C.3 reports the 
average Z-Score of the sound banks. All maps in Appendix C report quintiles. Two observations are 
noteworthy: First, soundness varies in several instances with state borders, highlighting that the 
inclusion of state fixed effects is useful for our empirical tests. Second, in areas with banks that 
have many regulatory interventions or capital support, the other banks tend to operate with 
relatively high Z-Scores, suggesting that observing distress among nearby banks may trigger 
changes in behavior by competitors, an issue that suggests scope for future research.   
2. Identification strategy and data 
2.1 Instrumental variable (IV) regressions 
To examine the effect of regulatory interventions and capital support on liquidity creation, we use 
the following regression setup: 
∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵4
′𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 
+ 𝛾𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑝 + 𝛿𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜃𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡      (1) 
where 𝛥𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is the change in liquidity creation (or one of its components: asset-side, liability-side, 
and off- balance sheet liquidity creation) scaled by total assets at bank i from year t-1 to year t, and 
t-1 is the year in which regulatory interventions or capital support took place. Regulatory 
interventions and capital support are defined in Section 2.2. The coefficients of interest are 𝛽2 
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and 𝛽3. Section 2.4 discusses the control variables and explains why we include banking pillar, 
year, and state dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level to control for serial 
correlation within each bank. 
Clearly, unobserved differences across banks that do not vary over time may result in bank 
heterogeneity that ultimately drives our inferences for the effects of regulatory interventions and 
capital support. To remove these time-invariant bank-specific effects, we follow the approach 
suggested in Wooldridge (2002), which is also widely used in corporate finance and banking (e.g., 
MacKay, 2003; Hennessy and Whited, 2007; Wintoki, Linck, and Netter, 2012; Ellul and 
Yerramilli, 2013; Bonaccorsi di Patti and Sette, forthcoming), and estimate all regressions in first 
differences, i.e., in changes from one period to the next period. Importantly, while first differencing 
is similar to the inclusion of bank fixed effects in that both remove time-invariant bank-specific 
unobservables, Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) highlight a key advantage of first differences: they focus 
on deviations of variables from their values in the previous period. This is important since bank 
fixed effects estimation is based on deviations from the mean for the bank and may introduce look-
ahead bias since means are calculated over the entire sample period.
9
 Similar to Nini, Smith, and 
Sufi (2012), we keep financial condition variables in levels to control more flexibly for the 
evolution of bank soundness over time. Regulatory interventions and capital support are also in 
levels as we view them as shocks. All other dummies enter in levels as well, as does the distance to 
the nearest metropolitan area. 
Estimating the regression equations also gives rise to identification challenges. Distressed 
banks may be aware of their unsound operations and may adjust their liquidity creation independent 
of actions by authorities. Further, regulatory interventions and capital support are not assigned 
                                                          
9 
Note that our tests not only include year fixed effects to net out any variation that affects all banks across Germany 
equally in a given year but also include state fixed effects to control for macroeconomic differences that vary on the 




randomly—they are more likely when banks are in trouble, a condition not necessarily observable 
to the econometrician. Naïve regressions that ignore these issues may yield biased coefficients. We 
use instruments, described in Section 2.3, to deal with this problem.  
First-stage estimates are obtained using linear probability models for regulatory 
interventions and capital support, respectively. In the second stage, we regress changes in liquidity 
creation (Δ (LC/Total assets)) or its components (∆ (LC asset side/Total assets)), (∆ (LC liability 
side/Total assets)), and (∆ (LC off-balance sheet/Total assets)) on the predicted values of the 
potentially endogenous explanatory variables, controls, and banking pillar, year, and state dummies.  
2.2 Potentially endogenous explanatory variables 
We use a regulatory interventions dummy to capture the disciplinary actions by regulators described 
in Section 1.2. This variable takes the value one if one or more interventions took place in year t-1 
and zero otherwise. We use a capital support dummy that takes the value one if support was 
provided in year t-1 and zero otherwise.  
2.3 Instruments  
Our identification strategy relies on three plausibly exogenous instruments. The identifying 
assumption is that our instruments affect the probabilities of regulatory interventions and capital 
support, but do not directly affect liquidity creation or the other outcomes studied. The instruments 
exploit in several dimensions information asymmetries among banks, regulators, and bankers 
associations’ insurance schemes that are crucially driven by geography. This strategy reflects that 
most banks operate in geographically delimited banking markets. Consequently, we constrain the 
sample for the main analyses to banks in delimited markets to leverage the power of our 
instruments, although our findings are unaffected when we include banks that operate nationwide.  
2.3.1 Vote share of pro-business parties in parliamentary state elections 
Our first instrument is the most recent state vote share of pro-business parties, measured as the 
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combined vote share of parties that are favorably orientated towards businesses in parliamentary 
elections at the state level. The motivation behind this instrument is based on Dam and Koetter 
(2012), who show that state level election outcomes matter for bank rescues in Germany. State 
parliamentary elections typically coincide with the county elections in each state and the results of 
elections for the members of the state legislature therefore closely resemble the variation in the 
electorate’s propensity to support pro-business parties at the county level. This is reflected in a high 
correlation of 0.81 (p-value 0.00) between the vote shares for pro-business parties at the state and 
county levels. Moreover, from an exogeneity perspective, relying on the state vote share rather than 
the county level vote share is more appropriate as the votes cast on the state level are less influenced 
by local banking conditions in the particular county where the distressed bank is located.  
To construct this instrument, we consider conservative (CDU/CSU), liberal (FDP), and 
green parties (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) as pro-business parties, and aggregate their percentage vote 
share in parliamentary state elections. They differ ideologically from social democratic parties 
(SPD), the left party (Die Linke), and others because conservatives, liberals, and greens represent 
interests of the upper-middle class, employers, and the business community, whereas social 
democrats, leftists, and others focus on protection of the labor force and redistribution of income.  
Election outcomes play a crucial role for regulatory interventions because the Bundesbank’s 
executive board and the BaFin’s executive officers are appointed by the Federal President following 
nomination by politicians at the state and federal level. Partisan orientation of elected politicians at 
the state level should therefore influence the behavior of regulators for several reasons.  
First, the economics literature on appointed regulators argues that politicians adopt policies 
in line with the interests of stakeholders to increase their chances of re-election (Grossman and 
Helpman, 1994; Botero, Djankov, LaPorta, and Lopez-De-Silanes, 2004). This literature shows that 
electoral incentives make politicians respond to stakeholder interests because voters are 
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stakeholders in the regulated firms. Ultimately, regulatory actions become bundled with other 
policy issues for which the appointing politicians are responsible (Besley and Coate, 2003). Second, 
while the BaFin ultimately issues the regulatory intervention, the Bundesbank is involved 
throughout the process. Most importantly, the heads of supervision from the regional Bundesbank 
office in whose business area the distressed bank is located critically influence the decision of 
whether or not to intervene, and these supervisors are appointed by the executive board of the 
Bundesbank. Both arguments suggest that pro-business oriented politicians are likely to nominate 
candidates for the Bundesbank executive board whose views are in line with party ideology.
10
 The 
banking community represents some core constituents of the pro-business parties. It is therefore in 
the interest of these parties to preserve banks as a going concern, one of the key considerations 
behind issuing regulatory interventions since they reduce the likelihood of bank closures. We 
therefore anticipate that a greater share of pro-business parties increases the probability of observing 
regulatory interventions.  
Notably, while this instrument is not bank-specific, three characteristics make it appealing 
for our research. First, it varies across states and over time as parliamentary elections at the state 
level take place at different times in different states. Their timing is dictated by an exogenous rule 
that varies for each state between four and five years. Second, it is correlated with the county-level 
support for pro-business parties. Third, the instrument adequately reflects that all banks in 
Germany, except for the largest banks which are excluded from our sample, operate in local 
markets. This geographical feature of the German banking system facilitates identification. It is 
unlikely that four- and five-year cycles of voting patterns at the state level correlate with annual 
                                                          
10 Election outcomes may also influence the decisions of bankers associations’ insurance schemes to provide capital 
support, albeit to a lesser extent. Behn, Haselmann, Kick, and Vig (2014) document that politicians are represented on 
the boards of insurance schemes in one pillar, the public-banking sector. This allows them to influence the scheme’s 
decision to provide capital support. However, the effect is likely to be marginal for capital support relative to regulatory 
interventions as politicians can at best only influence capital support in one pillar.  
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changes in the outcomes we study, given that the banks in our sample operate in small local 
markets. In short, our instrument provides plausibly exogenous variation in ideology and partisan 
orientation of politicians involved in the nomination of members of the executive board at the 
Bundesbank which is unrelated to contemporaneous changes of banks’ liquidity creation.  
2.3.2 Distance between the bank and the bankers association’s insurance scheme 
Our second instrument is the distance in kilometers (ln) between the bank’s headquarters and the 
corresponding bankers association’s provider of insurance. The average (median) bank is located 
252 (379) km away from its insurance provider. This further capitalizes on the characteristics of the 
German banking system where geography and the associated information asymmetries between the 
bank and the authorities play a major role, and where regulators and the bankers associations’ 
insurance schemes independently monitor bank conduct.  
The reasoning for this instrument is as follows. First, various papers (e.g., Coval and 
Moskowitz, 2001; Hau, 2001; Degryse and Ongena, 2005) establish that geographical proximity 
reduces information asymmetries. Information asymmetries matter because they impede 
surveillance activities by the bankers associations’ insurance schemes. Sensitive information about 
bank soundness is more likely to be detected when monitoring agencies are located near the bank.
11
 
Second, transportation costs also play a role for monitoring intensity because they increase in the 
distance between the bank and its insurer. Such costs impede effective monitoring of banks located 
further away from their insurance scheme, and monitoring resources may be allocated more towards 
firms in close proximity. In particular, for smaller insurance schemes, resource constraints may play 
a role for the allocation of monitoring activities. Thus, proximity increases the likelihood that the 
insurer identifies ailing institutions and provides capital support. Third, the Bundesbank and the 
                                                          
11
 Evidence on the monitoring behavior of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the U.S. supports our 
argument. SEC monitoring is reduced when firms are located far away from an SEC office (Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011). 
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BaFin are aware of the monitoring activities of the bankers associations’ insurance schemes, and 
they may compensate for the reduced monitoring of faraway banks via more regulatory 
interventions. In other words, a greater distance from the location of the insurance scheme is likely 
to decrease the likelihood of capital support but increase the probability of regulatory interventions. 
Indeed, our summary statistics illustrate that the average distance to the insurer is shorter for banks 
with capital support (317 km) than it is for banks with regulatory interventions (368 km).  
This instrument has further advantages. First, unlike the vote share variable, this instrument 
is bank-specific. Second, it is clearly exogenous with respect to contemporaneous changes in bank 
liquidity creation because it is time-invariant and therefore cannot correlate in an unobserved 
manner with the outcomes we study. In fact, for most banks, their location choices date back to the 
19
th
 century, and insurance systems have been in place for decades, starting in the cooperative 
sector after the Great Depression. For private-sector and public-sector banks, insurance has existed 
since 1966 and 1969, respectively (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1992).  
2.3.3 Availability of a possible acquirer for distressed institutions 
Our third instrument gauges the likelihood that an ailing bank is acquired by another institution. 
Similar to the U.S. and elsewhere, distressed banks in Germany are often acquired by healthy 
institutions. However, what is important in our context is that such acquisitions can be arranged by 
bankers associations, but not by the BaFin or the Bundesbank, and legal requirements guide the 
choice of potential acquirers. Given this prominent role of private-sector arrangements for resolving 
troubled banks in Germany, we anticipate that the availability of a possible acquirer decreases the 
probability of regulatory interventions and reduces the need for capital support.  
The scope for acquisitions is limited in Germany. State laws for savings banks and the 
ownership structure of cooperative banks restrict these banks’ ability to merge with banks from 
other pillars. In addition, the regional principle to which these banks adhere requires that these 
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banks only merge with other banks in their administrative district. These restrictions do not apply to 
private-sector banks, public-sector Landesbanks, and central cooperative banks. Possible acquirers 
for those institutions can be located anywhere in Germany. Moreover, economic intuition suggests 
that banks’ ability to acquire a troubled bank is conditional on the acquirers’ own profitability and 
capitalization. These time-varying characteristics and the legal provisions for acquisitions generate 
variation in the availability of acquirers that is unrelated to contemporaneous changes in liquidity 
creation of distressed banks that we can exploit for our identification strategy.  
Construction of the instrument is as follows. First, for each bank in the sample, we identify 
potential acquirers by searching for potential healthy acquirers, defined as institutions with above 
median return on assets and capital adequacy in the same pillar that satisfy the location restrictions, 
if any, described above. Second, we restrict the set of possible acquirers and keep the largest bank 
in terms of total assets. Third, for each sample bank, we calculate the size difference between the 
largest possible acquirer and the bank itself, and express the resulting instrumental variable as a 
proportion of total assets of the bank itself. We thus end up with a narrow subset of banks that 
satisfy not only financial criteria that make an acquisition economically viable but also meet the 
legal provisions of the regulatory framework to acquire another bank.
12
  
The higher the value of this variable, the greater is the likelihood that an institution will be 
taken over to be restructured and thus, the smaller is the probability that it receives regulatory 
interventions or capital support. This instrument is bank-specific and varies over time.  
2.4 Control variables 
                                                          
12
 To illustrate how we construct the instrument, focus on a savings bank in the administrative district Upper Bavaria. 
To identify possible acquirers, we limit attention to all savings banks in Upper Bavaria that satisfy the location criterion. 
Among these, we identify savings banks with return on assets and capital adequacy above the median, and view the 
largest one to be the potential acquirer. The instrument is the size of this potential acquirer minus the size of the savings 
bank, normalized by the size of the savings bank. Computations are similar for cooperative banks. For private-sector 




Our regressions contain several control variables, which are lagged by one year. We express all 
financial variables in real € (year 2000) using a GDP deflator from the Federal Statistical Office. 
ΔTotal assets (ln) accounts for changes in bank size. ΔReturn on equity controls for changes 
in profitability. ΔLoan portfolio concentration is the change in a Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 
of lending activities across eight industries. ΔFee income, the ratio of fee income to total income, 
focuses on non-traditional banking activities to capture changes in the business mix. Local output 
growth in each bank’s market controls for local demand-side effects. This variable is measured at 
the county level. Tier 1 capital to total assets and Nonperforming loans to total loans enter in levels 
and capture the bank’s financial condition. Distance to the nearest metropolitan area (km, ln) 
measures the distance between the bank’s headquarters and the closest metropolitan area in the 
federal state.  
The regressions also include banking pillar, year, and state dummies. Pillar dummies, which 
are highly correlated with bank size, account for differences in business models and ownership 
structures (private-sector dummy is omitted to avoid perfect collinearity).
13
 Moreover, the inclusion 
of banking pillar dummies also helps capture institutional differences in the respective pillar. Year 
dummies capture effects that vary over time but affect all banks equally in a given year such as 
demand conditions and regulations. As discussed above, state dummies net out time-invariant 
omitted variables that affect liquidity creation of all banks in the same state.  
2.5 Data 
We obtain annual data for all banks operating in Germany between 1999 and 2009, and augment 
these with data about regulatory interventions and capital support, all provided by the Bundesbank. 
We impose standard screens and exclude banks if they have: i) no loans outstanding; ii) zero 
                                                          
13 
Cooperative banks are by far the smallest institutions, followed by public sector banks and private banks. This is 
particularly so for the largest banks in each pillar: at the 90
th
 percentile, cooperative banks / savings banks / private 
banks have a size of € 719 million / € 3,680 million / € 8,350 million, respectively.  
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deposits; or iii) balance sheet items with negative values. We treat acquisitions in the conventional 
way: the acquirer continues with its identifier post-acquisition. We drop the year of the acquisition 
to avoid artificial spikes in liquidity creation. Applying these restrictions results in a dataset with 
17,473 bank-year observations for 2,521 banks. To refine identification, we constrain the dataset to 
banks whose operations can be assigned to local banking markets. This results in a sample of 
17,342 bank-year observations for 2,501 banks. Table I contains summary statistics. 
3. Results 
3.1 Main results 
3.1.1 First-stage results: Instruments 
Our two first-stage regressions in Table II Panel A analyze the determinants of regulatory 
interventions and capital support. The three instruments are significant with the predicted signs in 
five of six cases, supporting the economic rationale underlying them.  
First, the distance to the bankers associations’ insurer is significant for capital support with a 
negative sign and it is positive for regulatory interventions, highlighting the complementarity 
between the actions of the insurance schemes and the regulators. Second, a higher vote share of pro-
business parties has a significant positive correlation with the likelihood of regulatory interventions, 
supporting our hypothesis. The finding that the vote share of pro-business parties enters with the 
expected sign but remains insignificant for capital support is in line with our argument that the vote 
share plays at best a minor role for capital support. Third, the availability of a possible acquirer 
significantly reduces the need for regulatory interventions and capital support, supporting the 
argument that the legal provisions that limit the choice of acquisition candidate matter.  
Most of the control variables have expected signs and are significant.  
3.1.2 Second-stage results: Regulatory interventions and capital support  
Our second-stage results, also in Table II Panel A, show that banks significantly reduce their 
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liquidity creation in response to regulatory interventions, but not to capital support. The results are 
economically significant. The average bank contracts liquidity creation normalized by total assets 
by 9.8 percentage points after regulatory interventions, which is large relative to the mean of 
22.3%.
14
 The signs on the control variables in the second stage are intuitive. 
Our specification so far uses all bank-years for banks that operate in local markets. 
However, typically only banks that are identified by regulators and bankers associations as 
potentially needing regulatory interventions and capital support are subjected to such actions. We 
therefore investigate subsamples of healthy and unhealthy banks. Absent an official list of 
unhealthy banks in Germany, we define banks that are at or below (above) the median equity ratio 
as unhealthy (healthy).  
Such a test is also useful to illustrate the validity of our instruments. Not only are unhealthy 
institutions likely to respond more strongly to the actions of interest, but finding that the instruments 
strongly predict capital support in the first stage for healthy banks would question our results since 
capital support is typically only provided to banks with weak capital positions. In contrast, banks in 
both subsamples may be subject to regulatory interventions, so we do not have specific predictions 
for the first stage for regulatory interventions.  
Table II Panel B reports the results. The first-stage results for regulatory interventions have 
no clear pattern across the two subsamples, as expected. The results for capital support show that 
none of the three instruments has predictive power for healthy banks, supporting our identification 
strategy. The second-stage results for regulatory interventions are significant only for unhealthy 
banks and this effect (13.4 percentage points) is greater in magnitude than for the full sample. 
                                                          
14 
We perform various robustness checks (available upon request). Results are similar when replacing state dummies 
with market fixed effects (defined by county borders) to deal with unobserved factors that affect all banks operating in 
local markets equally. Results are also comparable when including nationally active banks. In addition, reductions in 
local loan demand, approximated by contractions in local output growth, do not affect our inferences. Changes in 
governance structure such as executive turnovers, banks’ anticipation of authorities’ actions, or poor performance also 
do not drive the results.    
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Consistent with the main result, the effect of capital support is insignificant in both subsamples.  
3.1.3 Instrument strength and overidentification restrictions 
It is critical that our instruments are econometrically strong because weak instruments can lead to 
worse biases than OLS. We therefore report the standard F-statistic of excluded instruments and 
also show the Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-statistic, which tests whether individual endogenous 
regressors are weakly identified. Both statistics are significant, so we reject the null that our 
instruments are weak. To examine the overidentification restrictions, we present Hansen J-statistics. 
These diagnostics are statistically indistinguishable from zero, suggesting that the three instruments 
are correctly excluded from the second-stage equation.  
3.2 Components of liquidity creation and selected drivers 
We have already shown that regulatory interventions reduce liquidity creation, but it is interesting to 
understand where these adjustments take place: on the asset side, the liability side, or off the 
balance sheet. We therefore now decompose liquidity creation into these three components, and 
regress changes in asset-side, liability-side, and off-balance sheet liquidity creation (all normalized 
by total assets) on regulatory interventions, capital support, and our other explanatory variables.  
Table III Panel A illustrates that regulatory interventions only reduce liquidity creation on 
the liability side (by 5.4 percentage points) and off the balance sheet (by 4.5 percentage points). 
Instead of altering their asset portfolios, banks respond to the interventions primarily by adjusting 
their funding and off-balance sheet activities.  
This analysis yields another insight. Capital support reduces asset-side liquidity creation by 
an economically significant amount (10.6 percentage points) and increases liability-side liquidity 
creation by a similar amount (8.1 percentage points). These effects thus cancel each other out, 
explaining why we find no overall effect of capital support on total liquidity creation. There is no 
significant measured effect of capital support on off-balance sheet liquidity creation.  
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Table III Panel B repeats these tests, splitting the sample at the median equity ratio to 
examine whether the components of liquidity creation respond differently at banks with relatively 
high or low capital ratios. Regulatory interventions have again no effect on the asset side, and they 
affect the liability side only at banks with equity ratios below the median. Regulatory interventions 
significantly affect off-balance sheet liquidity creation in both subsamples. As expected, capital 
support only affects liquidity creation on the asset side of banks with equity ratios below the 
median. On the liability side, the effects are significant for both subsamples, but the statistical 
significance declines. Capital support does not affect off-balance sheet liquidity creation.  
The result above that capital injections cause asset-side liquidity creation to contract 
warrants more discussion. First, and as mentioned in the Introduction, theories are split on the role 
of bank capital for liquidity creation. Some posit a negative effect. Diamond and Rajan (2000) argue 
that capital hampers liquidity creation because it reduces depositor monitoring necessary for 
liquidity creation. Gorton and Winton (2000) argue that capital reduces liquidity creation because it 
crowds out deposits, a key source of liquidity creation. Other theories collectively suggest that 
higher capital improves banks’ ability to create liquidity. One set argues that liquidity creation 
exposes banks to liquidity risk (e.g., Allen and Santomero, 1998; Allen and Gale, 2004), while 
another posits that capital absorbs risk and expands banks’ risk-bearing capacity (e.g., Bhattacharya 
and Thakor, 1993; Repullo, 2004; von Thadden, 2004), so higher capital ratios may enable banks to 
create more liquidity. Donaldson, Piacentino, and Thakor (2015) does not fall in either group, but 
shows that higher capital incentivizes banks to work harder, leading to more lending and liquidity 
creation. Our results lend support to the theories that predict a negative effect of capital on (asset-
side) liquidity creation. Our results are also in line with the evidence for small banks in other 
countries: the U.S. (Berger and Bouwman, 2009), Russia (Fungacova, Weill, and Zhou, 2010), 
China (Lei and Song, 2013), and the Czech Republic (Horvath, Seidler, and Weill, 2014).  
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3.3 Extensions: Lending activities and risk taking 
We also investigate asset-side liquidity creation from a different perspective by looking directly at 
lending. Table IV examines changes in total loans and the two main lending categories: corporate 
loans and retail loans (both scaled by total assets). We find that regulatory interventions have no 
effect on lending, which is consistent with the result that such interventions do not affect asset-side 
liquidity creation. In contrast, capital support reduces total loans by 15.2 percentage points, 
consistent with our result that capital support reduces asset-side liquidity creation. The effect is 
greater for corporate loans (11.1 percentage points) than for retail loans (4.7 percentage points).  
 We next examine whether regulatory interventions and capital support reduce bank risk 
taking, one of the main goals of these actions. We focus on two widely used and complementary 
bank risk taking measures: changes in log-transformed Z-Scores (∆ Z-Score (ln)), where the Z-
Score is computed as return on assets (ROA) plus the capital ratio divided by the standard deviation 
of ROA, and changes in the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets (∆ (RWA/Total assets)). Our 
results show that Z-Scores (ln) increase by 2.7 whereas risk-weighted asset ratios decline by 15.0 
percentage points, both suggesting declines in risk taking. Importantly, capital support now enters 
significantly with intuitive effects: it increases Z-Scores (ln) by 3.8 percentage points and reduces 
risk-weighted asset ratios by 10.5 percentage points. These tests highlight that capital support plays 
a crucial part for banks’ incentives to take risk, in line with theory showing that capital reduces 
asset-substitution moral hazard (e.g., Morrison and White, 2005) and strengthens banks’ monitoring 
incentives (e.g., Allen, Carletti and Marquez, 2011; Mehran and Thakor, 2011).  
3.4 Different types of regulatory interventions 
It is important to understand whether all types of regulatory interventions trigger similar effects, or, 
alternatively, if more severe interventions cause greater changes in conduct than moderate 
interventions. It is also useful to evaluate if the changes in liquidity creation are due to restrictions 
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and prohibitions of business activities or due to interventions that are directly aimed at bank 
management. To address these issues, we split the regulatory interventions along these dimensions.  
Table V Panel A focuses on moderate versus severe interventions. The coefficient on severe 
regulatory interventions is more than twice as large as that for moderate interventions, showing 
significant decreases in liquidity creation by 27.9 and 11.1 percentage points, respectively. Splitting 
liquidity creation into its components, both moderate and severe interventions play no role on the 
asset side, but they do reduce liquidity creation on the liability side and off the balance sheet.  
Table V Panel B focuses on interventions that affect business activities versus management. 
Interventions aimed at business activities do not significantly affect liquidity creation or its 
components, except that they reduce off-balance sheet liquidity creation. However, interventions 
aimed at management are the driving force behind the observed declines in liquidity creation and its 
liability-side and off-balance sheet components. Neither interventions aimed at business activities 
nor those aimed at management affect liquidity creation on the asset side of the balance sheet.  
3.5 Long-run effects 
We have so far focused on the short run, i.e., the effects in the year after regulatory interventions 
and capital support. Natural questions that arise are whether the adjustments in bank behavior take 
longer than a year to be implemented and whether these effects persist or are subsequently reversed.  
 We now examine the effects of both actions on liquidity creation and its components in the 
long run. These IV regressions are similar to the main regressions with the only difference being 
that we lag the explanatory variables by 2, 3, or 4 years instead of 1 year. We do not include lags of 
multiple lengths in the same regression because of the dearth of available instruments. Table VI 
shows that none of the longer lags is significant. This suggests that the effects of regulatory 
interventions and capital support materialize quickly and are not reversed in subsequent years.  
4. Concluding remarks  
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When banks are troubled, authorities often issue regulatory interventions and/or provide capital 
support (bailouts). While the main goal of such actions is to reduce banks’ risk taking to restore safe 
and sound operations, these actions may have the unintended effect of reducing liquidity creation, 
which may adversely affect the real economy. The focus of this paper is to study the effects of 
authorities’ actions on liquidity creation.  
Using a unique dataset from Germany and relying on three plausibly exogenous instruments, 
we find that regulatory interventions reduce liquidity creation, while capital support does not affect 
liquidity creation. Further investigation suggests that regulatory interventions do not affect liquidity 
creation on the asset side of the balance sheet, but they do affect liquidity creation on the liability 
side and off the balance sheet. Capital support has no effect on off-balance sheet liquidity creation 
but reduces asset-side and increases liability-side liquidity creation by roughly the same magnitude, 
effectively canceling out each other. We also show that regulatory interventions have no effect on 
lending, a key component of asset-side liquidity creation, but capital support triggers declines in 
lending. As expected, both regulatory interventions and capital support reduce bank risk taking.  
Our findings that capital support reduces lending and risk taking differ from some of the 
U.S. TARP studies, which report mixed results. Differences between the U.S. and Germany may 
explain these dissimilar results. First, capital support under the TARP program took place only 
during the recent crisis, while our sample spans both crisis and non-crisis periods. Second, in 
contrast to the U.S. where capital support draws on taxpayer money, it is predominantly private 
parties in the form of bankers associations’ insurance schemes that provide capital support in 
Germany. The U.S. is moving more in this direction. Under Dodd-Frank, taxpayers will no longer 
be responsible for the costs of resolving systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). This 
cost will be borne by other SIFIs. Our study sheds new light on how the design features of bank 
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Table I: Summary statistics 
We present summary statistics for dependent variables, potentially endogenous explanatory variables, instruments, control variables, and pillar dummies. While regressions are run in changes (except 
for the dummies, including the potentially endogenous explanatory variables; the instruments; the Tier 1 capital ratio; the nonperforming loans ratio; and the distance to the nearest metropolitan area), 
we report summary statistics for the levels of all the variables for ease of interpretation. Panel A shows summary statistics for the full sample. Panels B, C, and D report these statistics for bank-years 
with regulatory interventions only, capital support only, and both types of actions in the previous year, respectively. All of the ratios are expressed in percentage terms (%). Liquidity creation is 
alternatively defined as the Mat Cat Fat measure, which includes off-balance sheet activities (see Appendix A), and its three components (asset-side, liability-side, and off-balance sheet liquidity 
creation). All are scaled by total assets. Lending is measured as total loans, corporate loans, and retail loans, all scaled by total assets. Risk is measured as the Z-Score (ln) and the ratio of risk-
weighted assets to total assets. The potentially endogenous explanatory variables are: regulatory interventions (dummy) and capital support (dummy). They are instrumented by: the state vote share of 
pro-business parties (%); the distance between the bank and its bankers association’s provider of insurance (km, ln); and the availability of a possible acquirer (%). The control variables include: total 
assets (€, ln); return on equity (operating income divided by equity capital); loan portfolio concentration (a Herfindahl-Hirschman index); fee income divided by total income; Tier 1 capital divided 
by total assets; nonperforming loans divided by total loans; local output growth; and distance to the nearest metropolitan area (km, ln). The regressions also include dummies for the public-sector and 
cooperative-sector pillars (the private-sector pillar dummy is excluded as the base case), year dummies, and state dummies. Summary statistics for year and state dummies are suppressed to save 
space.  
 Panel A: Full sample 
 
(17,342 bank-year observations) 
Panel B: Bank-years with 
regulatory interventions in 
t-1 
(448 bank-year observations) 
Panel C: Bank-years with 
capital support in t-1 
 
(357 bank-year observations) 
Panel D: Bank-years with 
regulatory interventions 
and capital support in t-1 
(68 bank-year observations) 
 Mean  S.D. Median Mean  S.D. Median Mean  S.D. Median Mean  S.D. Median 
Dependent variables             
LC/Total assets (%) 22.29 10.55 23.14 22.16 9.88  23.68 21.78 9.19 21.79 23.71 8.59 22.73 
LC asset side/Total assets (%) 13.76 10.18 15.25 14.26 9.21 16.10 12.82  9.54 13.80 14.77  7.86 14.16 
LC liability side/Total assets (%) 5.82 4.01 5.178 5.10 3.04 4.72  6.43 4.00 6.34 6.52 3.73 6.40 
LC off-balance sheet/Total assets (%) 2.62 1.85 2.167 2.74 1.86 2.24  2.48 1.47 2.19 2.46 1.52 2.11 
Total loans/Total assets (%) 57.85 14.35 59.78 61.61 13.71 64.73 57.32 15.23 57.81 58.44  14.75 59.80 
Corporate loans/Total assets (%) 26.23 9.75 25.96 30.87 9.98  30.85 30.05 9.85 29.70 33.05 9.96 31.57 
Retail loans/Total assets (%) 31.42 11.47 31.73 30.66 9.05 31.51  27.13 11.57 26.59 25.39 7.91 25.8 
Z-Score (ln) 4.58 1.28 4.50 4.33 1.28 4.42 4.23 1.55 4.26  3.71 1.56 3.69 
RWA/Total assets (%) 59.42 12.54 60.32 62.48 10.39 62.60 59.90 12.52 61.12 61.26 10.52 60.44 
Potentially endogenous explanatory variables               
Regulatory interventions (dummy) 0.03 0.16  0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Capital support (dummy) 0.02  0.14 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Instruments             
State vote share of pro-business parties (%) 58.20 8.43 60.25 56.43  6.89 53.87 57.24 8.12  60.25 56.39 8.77 54.22 
Distance to bankers association’s insurer (km, ln) 5.53 0.95 5.94 5.91 0.51 6.03 5.76 0.74 6.04 5.87 0.40 6.05 
Availability of a possible acquirer (%) 12.83 26.37 3.88 10.34 18.05  3.66  7.00 25.39 1.22 5.80 23.67 1.33 
Control variables             
Total assets (€, ln) 19.57 1.36 19.49 19.24  1.17 19.18 19.80 1.03 19.62 19.74  1.05 19.85 
Return on equity (%) 4.50 3.68 4.214 3.75 4.09 3.55 1.65 4.26 2 -0.61 5.97 1.75 
Loan portfolio concentration (HHI) (%) 29.83 12.63 26.18 27.69  11.57 24.13 29.95 11.68 26.46 30.09 11.69  27.17 
Fee income/Total income (%) 12.64 5.45 11.85 12.48 4.32  12.31 13.30 4.84  12.78 14.16 4.24 13.77 
Tier1 capital/Total assets (%) 5.677 1.67  5.39 5.28 1.33 5.04  5.08 1.51 4.79 4.80 1.40 4.57 
Nonperforming loans/Total loans (%) 4.49 3.60 3.61 7.17  4.06 6.63 11.53 6.35 10.91 14.34 5.62 14.93 
Local output growth (%) 1.87 3.32 1.82 1.52 3.04 1.29  1.81  2.79 1.72 1.10 3.91 0.74 
Distance to nearest metropolitan area (km, ln) 3.88 1.08 4.17 3.94 1.04 4.21 3.82 1.16  4.15 3.81 1.08 4.14 
Dummies             
Public-sector pillar (dummy) 0.25 0.43 0  0.04 0.20 0 0.05 0.22 0 0 0 0 




Table II: Main results and sample split by equity ratio 
This table shows IV regressions for the effects of regulatory interventions and capital support on liquidity creation (Δ (LC/Total assets)). Panel A presents the results for the full sample, and Panel B 
presents the results for subsamples of banks, split at the median equity ratio. The potentially endogenous explanatory variables, regulatory interventions and capital support, are measured as dummies. 
As instruments we use: the state vote share of pro-business parties (%); the distance between the bank and its bankers association’s provider of insurance (km, ln); and the availability of a possible 
acquirer (%). The control variables include: Δ Total assets (€, ln); Δ Return on equity (operating income divided by equity capital) (%); Δ Loan portfolio concentration (a Herfindahl-Hirschman index) 
(%); Δ Fee income divided by total income (%); Tier 1 capital divided by total assets (%); and Nonperforming loans divided by total loans (%); Local output growth; and the Distance to the nearest 
metropolitan area (km, ln). The regressions also include a constant, dummies for the public-sector and cooperative-sector pillars (the private-sector pillar dummy is excluded as the base case), year 
dummies, and state dummies (not shown for brevity). The regressions are run in changes (except for the dummies (including the potentially endogenous explanatory variables), the instruments, the 
Tier 1 capital ratio, the Nonperforming loans ratio, and the Distance to the neatest major metropolitan area (km, ln)). The potentially endogenous explanatory variables and control variables are lagged 
by one year. Robust z-statistics are in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
                                           Panel A: Full sample Panel B: Sample split by equity ratio 
    Equity ratio ≤p50 Equity ratio >p50 
 First-stage First-stage Second-stage First-stage First-stage Second-stage  First-stage First-stage Second-stage  


















Regulatory interventions   -9.8215**   -13.4173**   -6.4424 
   [-2.05]   [-2.11]   [-0.91] 
Capital support   -2.7828   -1.2440   -0.8351 
   [-0.66]   [-0.31]   [-0.09] 
Distance to bankers association’s insurer (km, ln) 0.0041**  -0.0052**  0.0064 0.004  0.0009*** 0.0011  
 [2.14] [-2.08]  [1.39] [1.48]  [3.53] [0.86]  
State vote share of pro-business parties (%) 0.0015*** 0.0001   0.0017***  0.0000  0.0000 -0.0001  
 [5.03] [0.42]  [3.58] [0.20]  [0.39] [-0.66]  
Availability of a possible acquirer (%) -0.0001** -0.0003***  -0.0000 -0.0002***  -0.0645** -0.0000  
 [-2.31] [-4.73]  [-1.49] [-3.19]  [-2.91] [-0.58]  
Δ Total assets (ln) -0.0004* -0.0015*** 0.0258** -0.0007*** -0.0010** 0.0153 -0.0004* -0.0003**  0.0361** 
 [-1.67] [-4.49] [2.41] [-2.17] [-2.19]  [1.03] [-1.78] [-2.13] [2.47] 
Δ Return on equity (%) -0.0009** -0.0002  -0.1454** -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0196  -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0221 
 [-2.54] [-0.59] [-2.23] [-0.98] [-0.96] [-1.20] [-1.34] [-0.73] [-1.60] 
Δ Loan portfolio concentration (HHI) (%) 0.0007  0.0005 0.0145 0.0008 0.0015** 0.0168 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0150 
 [1.39] [1.00] [0.8387] [1.56] [2.37] [0.68] [-0.52] [0.96] [0.52] 
Δ Fee income/Total income (%) 0.0001 0.0018* 0.0683* 0.0003 0.0023** 0.1298** 0.0005 0.0010 0.0203 
 [0.11] [1.76] [1.84] [0.27] [2.26] [2.52] [0.48] [1.22] [0.38] 
Tier1 capital/Total assets (%) -0.0045*** -0.0041*** -0.0758** -0.0038*** -0.0019* -0.2744*** -0.0019** 0.0002 -0.0481 
 [-4.58] [-4.20] [-1.96] [-2.89] [-1.86] [-2.87] [-2.23] [0.41] [-1.05] 
Nonperforming loans/Total loans (%) 0.0072*** 0.0116*** 0.0660 0.0049***  0.0060*** 0.0784 0.0038*** 0.0008 0.0231 
 [9.81] [11.21] [1.27] [5.70] [5.03] [1.09] [3.04] [1.40] [0.45] 
Local output growth (%) -0.000 0.0001 -0.0027 -0.0005 -0.0000 -0.0035 -0.0003 0.0005*** 0.0001 
 [-0.21] [0.33] [-0.26] [-0.98] [-0.22] [-0.21] [-0.87] [2.58] [0.00] 
Distance to nearest metropolitan area (km, ln) -0.0026 -0.0036* -0.0828** -0.0018 -0.0027 -0.1531** -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0237 
 [-1.59] [-1.82]  [-2.39] [-1.15] [-1.52] [-2.35] [-0.53] [-0.46] [-0.63] 
Banking pillar, year, and state dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,342 17,342 17,342 8,675 8,675 8,675 8,667 8,667 8,667 
Number of banks 2,501 2,501 2,501 1,369 1,369 1,369 1,132 1,132 1,132 
Hansen J statistic   1.98   1.99   0.51 
p-value of Hansen   0.15   0.16   0.47 
AP multivariate F-Test (Regulatory interventions) 16.45***   8.68***    6.20***   
First stage F-Test (Regulatory interventions) 11.51***   5.82***   5.10***   
AP multivariate F-Test (Capital support)  14.27***   11.75***    5.55***  





Table III: LC components and sample split by equity ratio 
This table presents second-stage IV regressions to examine how regulatory interventions and capital support affect the main components of liquidity creation (asset-side, liability-side, and off-balance 
sheet liquidity creation). Panel A uses the full sample. Panel B splits the sample at the median equity ratio. The instruments are: the state vote share of pro-business parties (%); the distance between the 
bank and its bankers association’s provider of insurance (km, ln); and the availability of a possible acquirer (%). Every regression includes a constant term, all the control variables shown in Table II, 
and banking pillar, year, and state dummies (not shown for brevity). The regressions are run in changes (exceptions are noted in Table II). The potentially endogenous explanatory variables and control 
variables are lagged by one year. Robust z-statistics are in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Panel A: Full sample  
Dependent variable ∆ (LC asset side/Total assets) ∆ (LC liability side/Total assets) ∆ (LC off-balance sheet/Total assets) 
Regulatory interventions 1.7211 -5.4444** -4.4939*** 
 [0.40] [-2.19] [-3.84] 
Capital support -10.5872*** 8.1194*** 0.8018 
 [-2.79] [3.17] [0.73] 
Control variables from Table II Yes Yes Yes 
Banking pillar, year, and state dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,342 17,342 17,342 
Number of banks 2,501 2,501 2,501 
Hansen J statistic 1.47 0.00 2.35 
p-value of Hansen 0.22 0.95 0.12 
AP multivariate F-Test (Regulatory interventions) 11.29*** 11.29*** 16.45*** 
First stage F-Test (Regulatory interventions) 7.97*** 7.97*** 11.51*** 
AP multivariate F-Test (Capital support) 1.17 1.17  14.27*** 
First stage F-Test (Capital support) 1.66 1.66  9.83*** 
Panel B: Sample split by equity ratio  
Dependent variable ∆ (LC asset side/Total assets) ∆ (LC liability side/Total assets) ∆ (LC off-balance sheet/Total assets) 
 Equity ratio  
≤p50 








Equity ratio  
>p50 
Regulatory interventions 0.0090 1.5870 -7.1464** -2.8153 -3.7896** -4.6243*** 
 [0.00] [0.24] [-2.07] [-0.92] [-2.47] [-2.61] 
Capital support -6.2411** -9.1566 5.0410** 9.0893* 0.8633 1.6985 
 [-2.11] [-1.13] [2.19] [1.80] [0.84] [0.75] 
Control variables from Table II Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Banking pillar, year, and state dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,675 8,667 8,675 8,667 8,675 8,667 
Number of banks 1,369 1,132 1,369 1,132 1,369 1,132 
Hansen J statistic 1.72 5.92 0.85 7.45 4.07 0.09 
p-value of Hansen 0.18 0.01 0.35 0.00 0.04 0.75 
AP multivariate F-Test (Regulatory interventions) 5.82*** 6.20*** 5.82*** 6.20*** 5.82*** 6.20*** 
First stage F-Test (Regulatory interventions) 8.68*** 5.10*** 8.68*** 5.10*** 8.68*** 5.10*** 
AP multivariate F-Test (Capital support) 11.75*** 5.55*** 11.75*** 5.55*** 11.75*** 5.55*** 






Table IV Extensions: Lending and risk taking 
This table presents second-stage IV regressions to show how regulatory interventions and capital support affect lending and risk taking. We examine changes in total loans and two key lending 
categories, corporate loans and retail loans (all scaled by total assets). Changes in risk taking are measured by changes in the Z-Score (ln) and changes in the ratio of risk weighted assets to total assets. 
The instruments are: the state vote share of pro-business parties (%); the distance between the bank and its bankers association’s provider of insurance (kilometers, ln); and the availability of a possible 
acquirer (%). Every regression includes a constant term, all the control variables shown in Table II, and banking pillar, year, and state dummies (not shown for brevity). The regressions are run in 
changes (exceptions are noted in Table II). The potentially endogenous explanatory variables and control variables are lagged by one year. Robust z-statistics are in brackets. Standard errors are 
clustered at the bank level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 Change in lending Change in risk taking 
Dependent variable ∆ (Total loans/Total assets) ∆ (Corporate loans/Total 
assets) 
∆ (Retail loans/Total 
assets) 
∆ Z-Score (ln) ∆ (RWA/Total assets) 
Regulatory interventions -3.1662 -1.7619 -0.6785 3.8324*** -10.5363** 
 [-0.75] [-0.59] [-0.29] [2.71] [-2.07] 
Capital support -15.2090*** -11.0787*** -4.7079* 2.6981** -14.9831*** 
 [-3.2] [-3.47] [-1.91] [2.09] [-2.98] 
Control variables from Table II Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Banking pillar, year, and state dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,342 17,342 17,342 17,342 17,342 
Number of banks 2,501 2,501 2,501 2,501 2,501 
Hansen J statistic 2.37 2.60 0.65 0.00 1.21 
p-value of Hansen 0.12 0.10 0.41 0.94 0.27 
AP multivariate F-Test (Regulator interventions) 16.45*** 16.45*** 16.45*** 16.45*** 16.45*** 
First stage F-Test (Regulatory interventions) 11.51*** 11.51*** 11.51*** 11.51*** 11.51*** 
AP multivariate F-Test (Capital support) 14.27*** 14.27*** 14.27*** 14.27*** 14.27*** 






Table V: Types of regulatory interventions 
This table presents second-stage IV regressions to show how different types of regulatory interventions as well as capital support affect liquidity creation and its components (asset-side, liability-side, 
and off-balance sheet liquidity creation). Panel A splits regulatory interventions by severity (into those that are moderate and those that are severe), and Panel B splits them by orientation (into those that 
directly affect business activities and those that directly affect management). As instruments we use: the state vote share of pro-business parties (%); the distance between the bank and its bankers 
association’s provider of insurance (km, ln); and the availability of a possible acquirer (%). Every regression includes a constant term, all the control variables shown in Table II, and banking pillar, year, 
and state dummies (not shown for brevity). The regressions are run in changes (exceptions are noted in Table II). The potentially endogenous explanatory variables and all control variables are lagged by 
one year. Robust z-statistics are in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Panel A: Regulatory interventions by severity   Liquidity creation Components of liquidity creation 




∆ (LC asset side 
/Total assets) 
∆ (LC asset side 
/Total assets) 
∆ (LC liability side 
/Total assets) 
∆ (LC liability side 
/Total assets) 
∆ (LC off-balance 
sheet/Total assets) 
∆ (LC off-balance 
sheet/Total assets) 
Regulatory interventions (moderate) -11.0956**  2.2427  -6.3070**  -5.1133***  
 [-2.01]  [0.45]  [-2.17]  [-3.83]  
Regulatory interventions (severe)  -27.8719**  1.2594  -13.5496**  -12.3100*** 
  [-1.99]  [0.11]  [-2.03]  [-2.91] 
Capital support  -3.9372 -1.2811 -10.4296*** -10.2883*** 7.5029*** 8.6571*** 0.2791 1.4202 
 [-0.97] [-0.25] [-2.81] [-2.59] [2.99] [3.12] [0.27] [0.91] 
Control variables from Table II Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Banking pillar, year, and state dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,342 17,342 17,342 17,342 17,342 17,342 17,342 17,342 
Number of banks 2,501 2,501 2,501 2,501 2,501 2,501 2,501 2,501 
Hansen J statistic 2.37 0.49 1.41 1.74 0.01 0.10 3.22 0.27 
p-value of Hansen 0.12 0.48 0.23 0.18 0.89 0.75 0.07 0.60 
AP multivariate F-Test (Regulatory interventions) 18.07*** 6.00*** 18.07*** 6.00*** 18.07*** 6.00*** 18.07*** 6.00*** 
First stage F-Test (Regulatory interventions) 12.24*** 4.48*** 12.24*** 4.48*** 12.24*** 4.48*** 12.24*** 4.48*** 
AP multivariate F-Test (Capital support) 14.67*** 13.65*** 14.67*** 13.65*** 14.67*** 13.65*** 14.67*** 13.65*** 
First stage F-Test (Capital support) 9.83*** 9.38*** 9.83*** 9.38*** 9.83*** 9.38*** 9.83*** 9.38*** 
Panel B: Regulatory interventions by orientation Liquidity creation Components of liquidity creation 




∆ (LC asset side 
/Total assets) 
∆ (LC asset side 
/Total assets) 
∆ (LC liability side 
/Total assets) 
∆ (LC liability 
side 
/Total assets) 
∆ (LC off-balance 
sheet  
/Total assets) 
∆ (LC off-balance 
sheet  
/Total assets) 
Regulatory interventions (business activities) -55.6638  6.9183  -29.3691  -25.1227*  
 [-1.48]  [0.29]  [-1.47]  [-1.79]  
Regulatory interventions (management)  -10.3115**  1.7894  -5.7068**  -4.7159*** 
  [-2.07]  [0.39]  [-2.25]  [-4.00] 
Capital support  4.7538 -4.2862 -11.3802** -10.3214*** 12.0205** 7.2848*** 4.1857 0.1136 
 [0.54] [-1.05] [-2.05] [-2.79] [2.44] [2.97] [1.28] [0.11] 
Control variables from Table II Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Banking pillar, year, and state dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,342 17,342 17,342 17,342 17,342 17,342 17,342 17,342 
Number of banks 2,501 2,501 2,501 2,501 2,501 2,501 2,501 2,501 
Hansen J statistic 0.50 2.08 1.54 1.48 0.00 0.00 0.30 2.67 
p-value of Hansen 0.47 0.14 0.21 0.22 0.95 0.95 0.58 0.10 
AP multivariate F-Test (Regulatory interventions) 1.83 19.78*** 1.83 19.78*** 1.83 19.78*** 1.83 19.78*** 
First stage F-Test (Regulatory interventions) 2.42* 13.35*** 2.42* 13.35*** 2.42* 13.35*** 2.42* 13.35*** 
AP multivariate F-Test (Capital support) 8.39*** 14.73*** 8.39*** 14.73*** 8.39*** 14.73*** 8.39*** 14.73*** 





Table VI: Long-run effects 
This table presents the long-run effects of regulatory interventions and capital support on liquidity creation and its components (asset-side, liability-side, and off-balance sheet liquidity creation). Each 
column presents the second stage of a single IV regression: we do not include lags of multiple lengths of regulatory interventions and capital support in the same regression because of the dearth of available 
instruments. The individual columns present the coefficients for the n-th lag of these key variables, instrumented by the n-th lag of the state vote share of pro-business parties (%), the n-th lag of the distance 
to the bankers association’s provider of insurance (kilometers, ln), and the n-th lag of the availability of a possible acquirer (%), with n =2,3,4. Every regression includes a constant term, all the control 
variables shown in Table II, and banking pillar, year, and state dummies (not shown for brevity). The regressions are run in changes (exceptions are noted in Table II). The potentially endogenous 
explanatory variables and all control variables are lagged by one year. Robust z-statistics are in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Dependent variable ∆ (LC/Total assets) ∆ (LC asset side 
/Total assets) 
∆ (LC liability side 
/Total assets) 
∆ (LC off-balance sheet  
/Total assets) 






















after 4  
years 
Key variables (lag structure)              
Regulatory interventions (t-2) -9.7816   -16.5085   4.9429   6.6121   
 [-0.98]   [-1.54]   [0.97]   [1.56]   
Capital support (t-2) -9.9888   -15.7277   7.1765   -0.1031   
 [-1.64]   [-1.25]   [1.13]   [-0.06]   
Regulatory interventions (t-3)  -3.8483   -13.5773   13.3948   9.3771  
  [-0.32]   [-1.55]   [1.43]   [1.38]  
Capital support (t-3)  -10.4478   -20.9952   5.5658   -0.8917  
  [-1.56]   [-1.48]   [1.37]   [-0.44]  
Regulatory interventions (t-4)   30.3738   8.9470   10.0754   12.0827 
   [1.51]   [0.75]   [1.20]   [2.04] 
Capital support (t-4)   -3.7490   -10.9096   6.9015   -0.0458 
   [-0.45]   [-1.10]   [1.60]   [-0.01] 
Control variables from Table II Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Banking pillar, year, and state dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,164 15,297 14,452 16,164 15,297 14,452 16,164 15,297 14,452 16,164 15,297 14,452 
Number of banks 2,472 2,451 2,405 2,472 2,451 2,405 2,472 2,451 2,405 2,472 2,451 2,405 
Hansen J-statistic 0.26 0.99 0.51 1.44 0.45 0.18 0.02 1.07 0.58 0.97 0.33 1.20 
p-value Hansen  0.60 0.31 0.47 0.22 0.50 0.66 0.88 0.29 0.44 0.32 0.56 0.27 
AP multivariate F-Test (Regulatory interventions) 6.67*** 4.03** 2.60* 6.67*** 4.03** 2.60* 6.67*** 4.03** 2.60* 6.67*** 4.03** 2.60* 
First-stage F-Test (Regulatory interventions) 14.98*** 3.13** 2.19* 14.98*** 3.13** 2.19* 14.98*** 3.13** 2.19* 14.98*** 3.13** 2.19* 
AP multivariate F-Test (Capital support) 10.76*** 8.29*** 6.62*** 10.76*** 8.29*** 6.62*** 10.76*** 8.29*** 6.62*** 10.76*** 8.29*** 6.62*** 






Appendix A. Bank liquidity creation 
We calculate a bank’s € amount of liquidity creation using a slight variation on Berger and 
Bouwman’s (2009) three-step procedure, which is discussed below and illustrated in Table A.1.  
In the first step, we classify bank assets, liabilities, and equity as liquid, semi-liquid, or illiquid 
based on the ease, cost, and time it takes for customers to withdraw liquid funds from the bank, 
and the ease, cost and time it takes for a bank to dispose of its obligations to meet these liquidity 
demands. We follow a similar principle for off-balance sheet items. 
A small difference between our calculation of liquidity creation and the approach in Berger 
and Bouwman (2009) exists. They argue that all activities should be classified based on 
information on both product category and maturity. However, due to limitations of the U.S. data, 
Berger and Bouwman (2009) have to classify loans according to either category or maturity. The 
Bundesbank database, however, enables us to exploit information on both loan category and 
maturity when classifying these items.
15 
 
In the second step, we assign weights of either +½, 0, or -½ to all bank activities that are 
classified in the previous step. The signs of the weights are consistent with liquidity creation 
theory, which states that liquidity is created when banks transform illiquid assets into liquid 
liabilities. Liquidity is destroyed when liquid assets are financed by illiquid liabilities or equity. 
Hence, we allocate positive weights to illiquid assets and liquid liabilities, while negative weights 
are applied to liquid assets and illiquid liabilities and equity. We use weights of +½ and -½ 
because liquidity creation is only half determined by the source or use of funds alone. We apply 
the intermediate weight of 0 to semi-liquid assets and liabilities, based on the assumption that 
                                                          
15
 Another difference is that Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) preferred measure includes the gross fair values of off-
balance sheet derivatives. Since only notional amounts are available in the Bundesbank database and since 
derivatives affect liquidity creation only marginally in the U.S., we assume that this holds in Germany as well and 
exclude derivatives from our measure of liquidity creation. This should not have a large effect since most banks 
operate with close to matched books. 
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semi-liquid activities fall halfway between liquid and illiquid activities. In terms of off-balance 
sheet items, we follow Berger and Bouwman (2009) and apply positive weights to all illiquid 
guarantees.  
In the third step, we combine the activities as classified and weighted in the first two steps to 
obtain two liquidity creation measures. These measures classify activities based on both maturity 





Table A.1: Classification of bank activities and construction of the ‘Mat Cat Fat’ liquidity creation measure 
 
 
Step 1: Classify all bank activities as liquid, semi-liquid, or illiquid based on product category (‘Cat’) and maturity (‘Mat’).  
 
Step 2: Assign weights to the activities classified in Step 1. 
ASSETS:      
Illiquid assets (weight = ½)    Semi-liquid assets (weight = 0)   Liquid assets (weight = - ½) 
Loans to credit institutions > 1 year     Loans to credit institutions ≤ 1 year  Cash and due from other institutions 
Loans to customers > year     Loans to customers ≤ 1 year  Loans to credit institutions (due daily) 
Premises      Exchange listed fixed income securities 
Intangible assets      
Exchange listed equities and other non fixed income 
securities 
Non exchange listed fixed income securities      
Exchange listed investments in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries 
Non exchange listed equities and other non fixed income securities      Exchange listed participation rights 
Non exchange listed investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries       
Non exchange listed participation rights      
Subordinated loans to customers       
Subordinated loans to credit institutions       
Other subordinated assets        
Other real estate owned       
LIABILITIES PLUS EQUITY:      
Liquid liabilities (weight = ½)     Semi-liquid liabilities (weight = 0)  Illiquid liabilities (weight = - ½) 
Liabilities to credit institutions (overnight funds)      Savings deposits    Liabilities to credit institutions> 1 year    
Other liabilities to customers (transactions deposits)      Time deposits    Other tradable liabilities > 1 year   
      Liabilities to credit institutions ≤ 1 year   Bank's liability on bankers acceptances 
      Other tradable liabilities ≤ 1 year   Subordinated debt 
      Equity 
OFF-BALANCE SHEET ACTIVITIES:      
Illiquid guarantees (weight = ½)      
Lines of credit       
Guarantees       
Standby letters of credit       
All other off-balance sheet liabilities 
 
 
Step 3: Combine bank activities as classified in Step 1 and as weighted in Step 2 to construct our liquidity creation measure (include off-balance sheet activities: ‘Fat’). 
Mat Cat Fat =       





Appendix B. Geographic decomposition of banking markets 
This appendix shows the geographic segmentation of banking markets in Germany. It illustrates state borders using the federal state (“Bundesland”) Bavaria as an example (Figure B.1), administrative 
district borders in Bavaria (“Regierungsbezirke”, Figure B.2), and county borders in Upper Bavaria (“Landkreise”, Figure B.3). Counties are nested within administrative districts. 
 
Figure B.1: Germany and the federal state 
(“Bundesland”) Bavaria 
Figure B.2: Administrative district borders in Bavaria 
(“Regierungsbezirke”) 








Appendix C. Distribution of regulatory interventions, capital support, and Z-Scores of sound banks (1999-2009) 
This appendix shows the geographic distribution of regulatory interventions (Figure C.1) and capital support measures (Figure C.2). Figure C.3 shows the geographic distribution of sound banks’ 
Z-Scores (ln). All data are averaged at the district level. Table C.1 shows the time distribution of regulatory interventions and capital support. 
 
 
                      Figure C.1                              Figure C.2             Figure C.3 
 
Table C.1: Time distribution of regulatory interventions and capital support (based on bank-year observations) 
Year Regulatory interventions Capital support (dummy) Capital support (% of Tier 1 capital) 
   Mean S.D. p25 p50 p75 
1999 55 54 56.43 72.23 8.47 25.50 73.89 
2000 63 41 37.30 33.17 9.59 23.55 52.60 
2001 79 57 37.84 31.75 8.37 33.00 54.05 
2002 81 68 49.80 47.48 10.48 36.10 71.40 
2003 57 41 50.65 48.73 14.96 30.52 76.77 
2004 45 25 45.46 39.62 12.97 37.67 60.15 
2005 19 20 20.29 20.06 4.20 11.14  34.48 
2006 18 22 18.48  16.08 6.06 13.95 23.64 
2007 17 18 19.80 17.92 4.15 11.90 42.32 
2008 15 11 22.20 35.47 2.67 15.18 23.75 
Total 448 357 35.83 36.25 8.19 23.85 51.31 
 
